A new study was released by Branden Williams and the Merchants Acquirer Committee (MAC), and it is worth a read. One aspect that jumped to me is the percentage of compliance vs compliant rates shared in the study. The difference here is those who have represented being PCI Compliant through Attestations of Compliance (AOC) vs. those who have had their programs pressure tested by the criminals of the world, and been found wanting.
Here is the snippet from PCI GURU that highlights this state of discrepancy:
The biggest finding of the study and what most people are pointing to is the low compliance percentages across the MAC members’ merchants. Level 1, 2 and 3 merchants are only compliant around 67% to 69% of the time during their assessments. However, most troubling is that Level 4 merchants are only 39% compliant.
Depending on the merchant level, these figures are not even close to what Visa last reported back in 2011. Back then, Visa was stating that 98% of Level 1 merchants were reported as compliant. Level 2 merchants were reported to be at 91% compliance. Level 3 merchants were reported at 57% compliance. As is Visa’s practice, it only reported that Level 4 merchants were at a “moderate” level of compliance.
via New PCI Compliance Study | PCI Guru.
Here is the link to the report from Branden & MAC
Board of Directors, CISO, and legal should all care deeply that PCI (and of course and certainly other contractual agreements) security is achieved honestly. To often organizations view this like registering a car with the government. This is far to complex and impactful to people within and outside a given business. The cyber economic connections between proper, efficient, and effective security all lend to better products in the market and more focus on what the business is driving towards.
Is your program honestly secure and fully addressing these least practice principles?
Posted in audit, information security, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, PCI DSS
Tagged 2015, branden williams, Compliance, cyber, data breach, deluccia, expert, mac, pci guru, report, study, survey
Kaspersky Labs (a pretty wicked good set of researchers) published an analysis on the Snowden shared source code and found it identical in part to a piece of malware known as Regin. Regin has been in the digital space for nearly 10 years and has been attributed to a number of infected systems globally.
I would encourage everyone to read and understand the analysis as it is quite thorough and interesting .. go ahead, I’ll wait .. Comparing the Regin module 50251 and the “Qwerty” keylogger – Securelist.
While I cannot speak to the course and reason behind this tool, beyond the obvious conjectures, I would stress one critical point. Attribution and intent.
Attribution is hard and of little value
As we find with other digital attacks, attribution is very difficult and I often tell clients to not focus on that as a basis for sanity and response. This is obvious in the difficulty in attributing such attacks, but also the problems with incorrectly making such assertions. I.e., JP Morgan’s “Russian attack on the bank due to their activities” during Ukraine incident was in fact a breach due to simple human error on configuring a server.
We as the observers do not know the intent of the operatives with the malware. In this case with the NSA we have identified malware in various locations, but as we all know … malware code spreads pretty freely without much direction. The concept that one system was infected unintentionally or without purpose from the operators is pretty high.
This comes to the forefront with our own internal analysis of attacks and breaches in our corporate environments. We must seek out all of the possible vectors, and not allow our bias or evidence on hand sway us incorrectly.
Spiegel.de article on Kaspersky report and other thoughts